The development of an effective space surveillance network requires the creation of an comprehensive, accurate and trustworthy catalogue of objects in orbit. This forms the basis for the multitude of services such as conjunction prediction and re-entry warning are expected.

By comprehensive, the system must be able to those objects which may pose a threat to operational satellites. This means that they should be able to detect objects with a minimum diameter to cause a detectable or cumulative deterioration in the performance of a satellite. This minimum diameter is defined by both the kintetic energy contained within a piece of debris (related to the mass and velocity) and the probability that a satellite will be operationally damaged by the impact of such a piece of debris.

As with the diameter of an object, the accuracy that will be achieved is limted by numerous factors, these include the limits of the technology used, the number of sensors within the surveillance network and the observation conditions (at both sensor and target) when detecting a specific piece of debris.

When discussing the degree to which a system can be considered trustworthy, three main factors come into play. These are the degree of false readings created by a sensors, the method used to convert the detections into an orbit and the techniques used to relate individual detected passes to objects which already exist in the database. These are all affected by the way in which the sensor system is designed, the weighting or importance given to specific sensors and the actual technology employed when looking at orbiting debris.

In order to develop a system which provides the needed performance, as well as being economically viable, requires a careful monitoring of the interplay between the multiple factors which determine the final design. This is the purpose of the top-down stream of ESA SSA programme and development. Not an easy task – and there are no absolute answers – but in the area of complex system-of-system design, the Agency has a long history of successful and effective solutions.

When satellite imaging is mentioned, we usually think of satellites taking pictures of the weather, floods or downtown New York. This is one of the primary uses of satellites and one which has brought great benefits to many people. Within space surveillance, satellite imaging refers to taking pictures of satellites on orbit. But why would we want to do that?

One reason is when things don’t go as planned. Satellite operators cannot always see what is happening on the satellite directly, but rely on specific sensors to tell them if something has – or hasn’t – worked. This could be a signal to say that the solar panels have been set correctly. If this signal hasn’t been received, it could mean one of two things. Either the solar panel hasn’t been set correctly or the sensor has malfunctioned. But which one of the two is it? Sometimes this specific situation can be verified because there is no power being generated by the solar panel or the satellite’s attitude moves in such a way that indicates the solar panel is not sticking out of the side of the satellite body. In either case, an independant way to verify this would be useful.

Another reason is during re-entry. The way a space object is oriented can effect large changes in the re-entry profile. It can determine if the satellite will break up high in the atmosphere and these small pieces vapourise without touching the Earth’s surface or if the orientation will cause some drag or lift as it comes through the atmopshere and hence change the impact point. Being able to image an object as it comes close to re-entry and begins to be affected by the atmosphere can really help reduce the uncertainty in both these areas.

A final reason why satellite imaging is important is – as can be guessed – military. Having intelligence regarding the capabilities of satellites in orbit is very useful to military commanders. Using satellite imaging could be a good way to do this.

Of course any specific military requirments are out of the scope of the ESA SSA programme. It can be predicted that the resolution required to perform the first two functions of anomaly resolution and re-entry prediction is much less than that required for the third one.

The ESA OGS (image credit: Emmet Fletcher)

There are sometimes confusing statements made regarding the different sensors used within a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system. Even if we are discussing radar or optical, there are – in essence – three types of sensor: surveillance, tracking and imaging. Since imaging sensors are a very special type – and do not figure in the development of the ESA SSA system, we will ignore them for this specific discussion. What we will discuss here is the difference between surveillance and tracking sensors – a difference that is often overlooked or ignored or just not understood, but is of prime concern when discussing the development of an effective space surveillance system.

Tracking Sensors

It is probably easier to start any discussion of the differences between tracking and surveillance sensors by focussing (no pun intended) on the major characteristics of a tracking sensor.

Tracking sensors usually have a very small field of view – rather like when you use a domestic telescope and you can see a very small area of the sky. Given a fixed detector performance, the smaller the field of view, the more precise the locations of the objects detected within this field of view (when comparing like-for-like). This is fantastic when you want to increase the precision of an object for when you already have some orbital data of, such as a piece of debris for which you have a rough orbit and may collide with an operational spacecraft. You just take this rough orbit and set your tracking sensor to point along this orbit at the position you think the debris should be. When you see the debris, you can then create a more precise orbit – since your detector is looking at a very small region of space and so has a high precision.

The problem is – of course – that since you only see a small area of the sky, if the error on your rough orbit is too high, you might not see the debris at all (it might slip by outside your field of view). It also makes these sensors very inefficient (read: almost useless) for the build-up a catalogue of objects. Since the view is small, it is difficult to trap new objects, unless you are very lucky. Even then, given the small view, you only have a very short reading as the debris passes across the sensor. This results in an initial orbit guess (orbit determination) which can have very high errors. For the development and maintainence of a catalogue, we need a surveillance sensor.

Examples of European tracking sensors: TIRA (Germany), BEM Monge (France), OGS (ESA), CAMRA (UK)

Surveillance Sensors

The TFRM (image credits: Emmet Fletcher)

A surveillance sensor is the workhorse of a surveillance system. It provides the data for both the initial catalogue development (the so-called ‘cold start’) as well as the day-to-day maintenence of the catalogue.

The main difference between the tracking and surveillance sensor is that the surveillance sensor sees a very large area of the sky at the same time. It is also not actively looking for objects, but rather passively (which counterintuitveilly can be active) waiting for debris – any debris – to pass over it. Once it detects something passing over it, the data related to this pass is processed and passed to the catalogue maintainence system.

In this way, the surveillance sensor creates a ‘fence’ which is triggered by any object passing through it. No prior information is needed by the sensor to generate new data regarding a specific debris object and the system therefore does not need to be ‘tasked’ to look out for an object. In reality, the fence can also be generated using an active sensor scanning the sky with a frequency that ensures nothing will be missed. This is the case for radar systems which quickly scan across a path. It doesn’t look in all directions at all times, but still forms an effective fence.

Through the use of surveillance sensors, a catalogue can be built up. The precision of this catalogue will not be very high initially, although the design of the surveillance network should be such that the eventual precision using just the surveillance assets will be enough to give a reliable warning of potential collisions with operational satellites. When the warning is triggered, then comes the turn of the tracking sensors to refine the orbit of this debris and provide the precise information that satellite operators need to plan their maneouvres.

Examples of European surveillance sensors: GRAVES (France), RAF Fylingdales (UK/US), TFRM (Spain)

If you have any comments, clarifications, corrections or suggestions – please comment!

imageThis is an image taken by Ralf Vandebergh using commercial telescopes as the basis for the observations. This show the power of ground-based telescopes to take images of low-Earth orbit objects. Needless to say, the cost of Ralf’s system is probably an order of magnitute (or less) than the cost of a comparable radar-based system.

Of course, weather conditions and the illumination conditions from the Sun play a great deal in how good the image will be on any given observation; something that is not generally a problem for radar systems or space-based space surveillance. But I think the work that Ralf shows here is very interesting and could teach a few lessons to more formal systems.

Ralf’s home page is here: http://ralfvandebergh.startje.be/vieuw.php?qid=328303 and some articles he has written for Space Safety Magazine can be found here: http://ralfvandebergh.startje.be/vieuw.php?qid=328303

This looks pretty interesting. As the synopsis reads:

50 years after launching our dreams into space, we’re left with a troubling legacy: a growing ring of orbiting debris that threatens the safety of earth’s orbits. SPACE JUNK is a visually explosive journey of discovery that weighs the solutions aimed at restoring our planet’s orbits.

Experience mind-boggling collisions, both natural and man-made. Soar for the stunning depths of Meteor Crater to an unprecedented view of our increasingly crowded orbits – 22,000 miles above earth. Join us as foremost expert Don Kessler, the “Father of Space Junk,” guides us through the challenges we face in protecting them, forging a new age of space discovery

More information here.

 

I’m now getting ready for the 5th International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) conference which will be held in the beautiful French town of Versailles from the 17th to the 19th October.

As the conference outline says:

The fifth IAASS Conference “A Safer Space for a Safer World” is an invitation to reflect and exchange information on a number of topics in space safety and sustainability of national and international interest. The conference is also a forum to promote mutual understanding, trust, and the widest possible international cooperation in such matters. The once exclusive “club” of nations with autonomous sub-orbital and orbital space access capabilities is becoming crowded with fresh, and ambitious new entrants.

All of which means that ever more cooperation is needed in the fields of debris abatement, space surveillance and cooperation among space-faring entities. Indeed, this has been recognised in this year’s conference where there will be special sessions on debris remediation and space traffic control.

I’m really looking forward to this year’s event – the only problem is that there are four parallel sessions and I’d like to be able to divide my time between most of them!

If you are going to be there, please say “hello!”

A nice overview of why SSA is so important to protect our daily lives. Created by Astrium and very closely in line with what we have stated in the ESA SSA precursor programme….

I found this familiar-looking video the space.com website. From the look of the stock material, it one of ESA’s videos, but there is not attribution. In any case, it is a basic overview of what fragmentation is and why this is a problem on orbit:

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It was a pleasure to be invited to present at the AMOS conference. A very large audience with a really wide range of backgrounds, views and potential technical solutions.

I hope to go back again – although it’s a long way from Madrid!!

 

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Co-moderator for the "Integrating Diverse Data" panel
Co-moderator for the "Integrating Diverse Data" panel
Panellists: Vladimir Agapov (Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics) Duane Bird (USAF) Andrew D’Uva (Providence Access) Emmet Fletcher (ESA) T.S. Kelso (AGI/CSSI) (co-Moderator) Thomas Schildknecht (AIUB)
Giving the introduction for the "Integrating Diverse Data" panel
Giving the introduction for the "Integrating Diverse Data" panel
Panellists: Vladimir Agapov (Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics) Duane Bird (USAF) Andrew D’Uva (Providence Access) Emmet Fletcher (ESA) T.S. Kelso (AGI/CSSI) Thomas Schildknecht (AIUB)